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Abstract Informed consent processes are a vital component of both human and veterinary
medicine. Current practice encourages veterinarians to learn from insights in the humanmedical
field about how best to achieve valid consent. However, drawing on published literature in
veterinary and medical ethics, this paper identifies considerable differences between the
purposes of veterinary and human medical consent. Crucially, it is argued that the legal status
of animal patients as ‘property’ has implications for the ethical role of veterinary informed
consent and the protection of the animal ‘patient’. It is suggested that veterinary informed
consent should be viewed as an ethical pivot point where the multiple responsibilities of a
veterinary professional converge. In practice, balancing these responsibilities creates consider-
able ethical challenges. As an example, the paper discusses the renewed call for UK veterinar-
ians to make animal welfare their first priority; we predict that this imperative may increasingly
cause veterinary informed consent to become an ethical pressure point due to tensions caused
by the often conflicting interests of animals, owners and the veterinary profession. In conclu-
sion, the paper argues that whilst gaining informed consent can often be presented as a robust
ethical justification in human medicine, the same cannot be said in veterinary medicine. If the
veterinary profession wish to prioritise animal welfare, there is an urgent need to re-evaluate the
nature of authority gained through owner informed consent and to consider whether animal
patients might need to be better protected outside the consent process in certain circumstances.
Keywords Veterinary ethics . Responsibility . Informed consent . Animal
Introduction
Informed consent has become an important part of both modern day veterinary
practice and the practice of human medicine. Many countries, including the UK and
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the US require formalised consent procedures for veterinary treatment which appear
similar to those required in the medical setting in a number of ways. Valid informed
consent procedures in human medicine record a decision which is made voluntarily,
with full knowledge and understanding of the relevant information (Delcarmen and
Joffe 2005). Valid informed consent in veterinary practice requires similar consider-
ations, for example the UK regulatory body, The Royal College of Veterinary Sur-
geons (RCVS), states within its Code of Professional Conduct:
Informed consent, which is an essential part of any contract, can only be given by a
client who has had the opportunity to consider a range of reasonable treatment options,
with associated fee estimates, and had the significance and main risks explained to them
(RCVS 2014:Section 11.1)
Here, veterinary professionals are being reminded that alongside the obtainment of a
client’s signature on a form, there are certain criteria which must be fulfilled for legally
valid consent to be given. Specifically, there is a need for full information provision,
understanding and free choice during veterinary consent (Bateman 2007). With respect
to the criteria which must be met for valid consent to be given, the veterinary and
medical settings are identical.
Invalid consent is a concern for medical ethicists who have long argued that
consenting parties may not be given adequate information or fully understand the
proposed medical treatment (Byrne et al. 1988; Lavelle-Jones et al. 1993; Stanley
et al. 1998). Since veterinary consent has identical validity criteria there is clear scope
for veterinary professionals to learn from their medical colleagues when it comes to
improving the validity of their consent procedures. Indeed, this is already occurring in
the context of effective communication with studies of client-veterinarian interactions
identifying poor communication skills being displayed by some veterinary professionals
(Coe et al. 2008; Shaw et al. 2004b). Several authors have explicitly argued for
veterinarians to improve communication in line with their human medical colleagues
(Shaw et al. 2004a; Bonvici and Keller 2006).
The legal benefits of gaining valid consent are also shared by both professions.
Medical informed consent procedures play a vital role in legal protection for clinicians
from patient accusations of assault or malpractice (Jackson 2010). Veterinary informed
consent is also used to provide legal protection for both the owner and the vet
(Flemming and Scott 2004) and for some, veterinary informed consent has been
primarily defined as a risk management tool (Martin 2006). The UK RCVS has
identified improved veterinary informed consent practices as an important route to
reducing official complaints from animal owners (RCVS 2008).
In summary, there is plenty of scope for fruitful comparison between informed consent
processes in the veterinary and medical settings, in particular with regards to the criteria which
ensure the validity of informed consent and the role that a robust consent procedure can play in
avoiding legal proceedings. However, beyond validity criteria and litigation, there remain key
differences in the purpose of informed consent in the medical and veterinary settings and these
differences have significant ethical implications, particularly for the way in which animal
patients are protected. The aim of this paper is to re-evaluate the purpose of consent in a
veterinary setting and to make important differences clear, sounding a note of caution about the
extent to which consent in human and animal medicine contexts can be compared and
translated.
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What is the Purpose of Informed Consent in Medical Practice?
Reflecting on human medical practice, consent is the mechanism though which human beings
exercise their rights of determination over their own bodies. The relationship between bodily
rights and consent in the medical context were addressed by Judge Benjamin Cardozo in the
case of Mary Schloendorff v the Society of New York Hospital in 1914:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient’s consent commits an assault. (Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital,
211 NY 125 [NY 1914])
The widespread adoption of formal informed consent processes is generally attributed to the
outcomes of the Nuremberg trials, which addressed infamous atrocities suffered by the
subjects of medical research conducted by the Nazi regime (Murphy and Dingwall 2007;
Rogers et al. 2012). Public outcry and outrage within the medical profession led to the
adoption of the Nuremberg Code (1947), establishing informed consent as a guiding ethical
consideration in medical research. Informed patient consent was later developed to protect
autonomous choice in medical patients (Beauchamp and Childress 2013).
Autonomy is an important ethical concept and translates as ‘self-rule’. In their influential
book Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress propose that in order to be an
autonomous agent (i.e. someone able to consent) one must be able to act:
1. Intentionally
2. With understanding, and
3. Without controlling influences that determine their action
(Beauchamp and Childress 2013; p.104).
Autonomous individuals are suggested to be acting with sufficient information, understand-
ing and of their own free will. The similarity between these criteria for autonomy and those
earlier identified for valid informed consent illustrates how informed consent processes aim to
protect autonomous choice.
In practice, how patients’ choices should interact with the needs of others and the medical
profession can be ethically complex. Whilst the work of Beauchamp and Childress has
inevitably been subjected to academic scrutiny (for example see Lee 2010; Karlsen and
Solbakk 2011), for reasons of simplicity, only this view of how autonomous choice (and thus
consent) should influence medical decision making is discussed here. Continuing a principled
approach, respect for autonomy is viewed as just one of four guiding ethical principles
alongside beneficence (doing good), non-maleficence (preventing harm) and justice
(fairness) (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). These four principles must be balanced during
the ethical justification of an action, meaning respect for patient autonomy may be used to
counter arguments that result from the application of one of the other principles, such as
enhancing the wellbeing (doing good) of a population through harming an individual in
medical research. On the other hand, if a patient provides valid informed consent this may
offset concerns raised through the application of other ethical principles such as non-malefi-
cence. Patient informed consent, therefore, can have a particularly important or even pivotal
role in the weighing and justification of potentially harmful procedures such as the donation of
healthy tissues and organs or participation in medical research.
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In summary, medical informed consent procedures aim to protect an individual’s rights to
make autonomous choices concerning their own body. As such, medical consent might be
shown to protect a patient from procedures they do not want or to allow choice over the degree
of risk they are willing to accept in medical or research interventions. With this medical context
considered, how comparable is the purpose of informed consent in the veterinary setting?
What is the Purpose of Informed Consent in Veterinary Practice?
Whilst veterinary consent practices have attracted some attention in the literature, with a small
number of articles addressing the legal requirements and implications of veterinary consent,
there has been very little discussion of the ethical nature and purpose of veterinary consent
(Fettman and Rollin 2002). For example Flemming and Scott (2004) suggest that:
The purpose of informed consent is to provide the client enough information that he or
she can make an informed decision for or against the recommended health care.
(Flemming and Scott 2004; p.1439)
Flemming and Scott describe how informed consent processes improve an owner’s decision
making, but what is the purpose of requiring veterinary informed consent? Who is protected
and why? We have described how medical informed consent protects the human patient’s
rights to bodily integrity and that treatment without consent could result in accusations and
possible charges of assault being brought. In the veterinary context however:
Any unconsented harm caused by a veterinarian to an animal owned by another
individual would likely violate a property right and therefore be a form of civil wrong.
It is on this basis that the informed consent doctrine applies to animals and, thereby, to
veterinarians. (Flemming and Scott 2004; p. 1436 )
Flemming and Scott (2004) thus clearly illustrate how the purpose of the veterinary consent process
differs frommedical informed consent. Veterinary consent protects a right over property enjoyed by
the animal’s owner, however, it does not protect any legal or moral rights enjoyed by the animal
‘patient’ themselves. Unlike the assault charges faced by doctors acting without consent, a veteri-
narian acting without proper consent would be accused of damaging (animal) property.
Historically, this focus on property rights makes sense if one remembers that veterinary
consent was traditionally associated with making choices which preserved the economic value
of a farmer’s stock (Fettman and Rollin 2002). Veterinary informed consent still has the same
legal function today with animals being considered (for most legal purposes) as special
property (Flemming and Scott 2004b) However, in more recent years the relationship between
humans and animals in the veterinary setting has altered significantly, with more focus on
animals as companions and a broader understanding of the animal’s value, such as an
emotional significance, rather than only economic value (Hueston 2016; Hobson-West and
Timmons 2016). Indeed, Fettman and Rollin specifically link this shift to changes in the
‘paradigm’ of consent, suggesting that:
The growing populations of companion animals and the shift in veterinary-client
relationships to one founded in the human-animal bond has effectively altered the
paradigm of informed consent, even if the profession has not yet fully acclimated to
this important change. In this instance, the economic foundation of informed consent
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has largely been replaced by an emotional and moral one, wherein risk and benefit are
judged in terms of quality of life, empathy, anthropomorphism, and considerations for
informed consent not unlike those for parent, child, and paediatrician.
(Fettman and Rollin 2002; p.1386)
If we accept Fettman and Rollins’ argument then we accept that the purpose of informed
consent is influenced by the nature of the relationship between the owner and the animal.
However, what remains constant regardless of the type of owner-animal relationship is that
veterinary informed consent is designed to allow the owner to make autonomous choices
which protect the value of their animal (whether economic, emotional, etc.) to themselves. We
will later explore the relevance of Rollin’s comparison between vets and paediatricians when
exploring the implications of informed consent for veterinary professionals.
Veterinary Informed Consent: Implications for Animal ‘Patients’
If a medical patient is protected by a rigorous informed consent process, what does consent imply
for protection of a veterinary ‘patient’? Passantino et al. (2011) observes that the animal patient
cannot make their ownmedical decisions and suggests that veterinary consent ‘is not based on the
principle of individual autonomy, since [autonomy] expresses the subject’s self-determination,
which the animal species is not endowed with’ (Passantino et al. 2011; p.129). As argued above, it
is claimed here that veterinary informed consent does aim to protect individual autonomy, but that
of the animals’ owner, rather than the animal themselves. Passatino recapitulates that informed
consent does not protect patient autonomy in the veterinary setting, because of the lack of
capacity of animal patients to make their own medical decisions. This is a central point and
again highlights the difference in nature of consent practices; the autonomous decision made in
the veterinary context is not made by the ‘patient’ but by their owner. Importantly, when
considering the implications for the animal patient, a superficially comparable situation does
exist in human medicine where children or the mentally incapacitated are treated by medical
professionals with the consent of a parent or guardian.
Medical ethicists have paid a great deal of attention to how well bodily rights are protected
for humans who cannot consent to their medical treatment. The relatives or guardians of such
individuals have legal rights to make decisions on their behalf, however, it is well recognised
that a family member might not always promote the best interests of the patient when making
third party medical decisions (Downie and Randall 1997). Crucially, doctors cannot tailor
medical interventions according to the preferences of any consenting party (Birchley 2016),
rather they are obliged to act in the best interests of their patient only and third party consent
cannot be used against the patient’s interests. If a medical intervention which is argued to be in
the patient’s best interests carries a significant risk of harm, an independent assessment (for
example conducted by a court of law) may be required before doctors can proceed (WHO
2010), even when third party consent has been provided.
As in the human medical setting, it is of course a common scenario that an animal owner
and veterinary surgeon will both want what is best for the animal patient. However, it is
important to accept that the autonomous decision of an animal owner made according to their
legal rights might also be influenced by other factors. As highlighted above, an owner is giving
informed consent to veterinary treatment in order to protect the value of their animal as
perceived by themselves. This will not necessarily always coincide with what is in the animal’s
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best interests. Even where animals are primarily considered to be of emotional value, as in the
case of companion animals, a strong emotional bond might result in requests for prolonged
palliative treatment or surgical procedures which, it has been argued, might not always reflect
what is actually best for the animal patient (Palmer et al. 2012). It is precisely this concern
which underpins the need for an independent judgement in some cases which involve human
patients who are not able to provide consent for themselves, but which is not currently required
in the veterinary setting.
In summary, there are considerable implications for the wellbeing of animal ‘patients’
compared to human patients when considering the function of veterinary consent processes.
The difference arises from the fact that animals are not autonomous and cannot consent for
themselves and that the third party consent provided by their owner aims to protect their
interest or perception of the value of their animal. Whilst non autonomous humans still possess
rights over their own body which cannot be overruled by third party consent, the same
situation is not true for animals, and some animal owners may request veterinary interventions
which are not necessarily in their animal’s best interests. The veterinary informed consent
process aims to protect the owner’s right to make such choices, not to protect the animal
patient. It is this inherent tension which explains why veterinary informed consent should be
understood as an ethical pivot point. The article now moves to consider the implications of this
argument for the veterinary profession.
Veterinary Consent: Implications for the Veterinary Profession
We have highlighted the obligations of the medical profession to protect the best interests of
human patients who cannot consent to treatment themselves and how this obligation limits the
power of third party consent in human medicine. How comparable are the obligations of
veterinary professionals and what implications do they have for the scope of authority of
consent given by animal owners? Given the international variation which exists in veterinary
professional legislation, the UK veterinary profession is examined here as one example. We
hope that this paper will encourage more comparative work and reflection on the situation
beyond the UK.
The UK veterinary profession has long maintained that animal welfare is its primary
concern. The oath which must be taken by new veterinary surgeons in the UK states that:
.. ABOVE ALL, my constant endeavour will be to ensure the health and welfare of
animals committed to my care. (RCVS 2014)
But the code of conduct further recognises that veterinary surgeons’ professional responsi-
bilities to animals and their owners may, at times, conflict with each other and create ethical
dilemmas. The veterinary surgeon is therefore advised to balance their professional
responsibilities, having a first regard to animal welfare. The likelihood and accuracy of the
good intentions of such a code is not universally accepted. Hewson (2006) commented that ‘It is
impossible to know whether taking an oath makes a difference to an individual veterinarian’s
attention to animal welfare’ (Hewson 2006; p.809). More radically, it has even been suggested
that this declaration ‘is at best delusional since its principle claim – to champion the welfare of
animals –cannot be substantiated’ (Coffey 2008; p.266). Coffey (2008) argues that by con-
doning and supporting the domestication of animals the profession becomes a tool of animal
oppression; complicit by default in the abuse of animals. Others have taken a less polarised view
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but still argue that there are clearly likely to be conflicting motivations experienced by
veterinary surgeons that aim to advocate for animals and yet must also make a profit from their
services (Main 2006). These perspectives again articulate the tensions which make the process
of veterinary informed consent an ethical pivot point. In short, if the profession do abide by their
oath and prioritise animal welfare, what does this mean for veterinary informed consent?
This question is indeed a very relevant one in the UK, where the role of the profession as
animal welfare champions has recently been revisited by the British Veterinary Association
(BVA) through the publication of its ‘Vet Futures’ project (BVA 2016). The BVA hopes the
project will help shape the profession and provide a clear direction for development in the coming
years. The report outlines numerous recommendations and those at the top of the list are:
1. Develop and promote an animal welfare strategy for the veterinary Profession.
2. Enhance moral reasoning and ethical decision-making in education, policy-making,
practice-based research and everyday veterinary work
(BVA 2016; p6).
Such a renewed focus on ethics is welcomed, and some may feel this is long overdue, for a
profession which faces a myriad of ethical conflicts (Morgan 2007). In the report the BVA’s
pledge is to Bsupport members to maximise their animal advocacy potential and achieve good
welfare outcomes for animals^ (p.3). However, Fettman and Rollin (2002) argue that the
animal advocate (or paediatrician model) is but one of many ethical roles a veterinary surgeon
plays. Considering the BVA’s interpretation then, we pause to consider what a renewed focus
on animal welfare might mean for veterinary informed consent.
Authors have previously argued that veterinary surgeons, as animal welfare advocates,
would have an obligation to positively influence owner decision-making by promoting the
course of action which is best for the animal (Main 2006). Fettman and Rollin (2002) go
further and ask us to consider the implications of fully following through on patient advocacy.
In short, there may be no need for veterinary informed consent at all:
An extreme view of patient advocacy might lead one to conclude that there is no need for
informed consent from the owner, based on the assumption that the veterinarian knows
what is best and need not explain his/her decision-making process in selecting treatment.
In fact, there are situations where veterinarians are asked to serve only as a patient
advocate, when an owner adamantly insists that anything be done for his/her beloved
pet, regardless of the cost or inconvenience to the owner, as long as the animal does not
suffer unnecessarily or without clear benefit. (Fettman and Rollin 2002; p.1388)
Indeed, in emergency situations, veterinary surgeons in the UK (and other countries, including
Denmark) are obliged to act in the animal’s interests, both without payment and without the
owner’s consent (Sandøe et al. 2016). However, if animal advocacy is to be promoted as the
primary role of the vet then veterinary informed consent will have a reduced authority overall
and cannot be presented as the sole ethical justification for any veterinary procedures, unlike
comparable medical procedures, because its purpose is not to protect animals. Passantino and
colleagues (2011) make a similar claim suggesting that:
Choice of the treatment lies with the Veterinarian, because, for his/her professional
skills, technical and scientific knowledge of medicine, he/she stands on a higher level
than the owner of the animal. Once the treatment has been chosen, the veterinarian must
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propose it to the client, who might not accept it. In this case, the veterinarian is free of
any professional obligation and is not obliged to carry out any treatments that the client
may consider suitable, but which are against the physician’s Bscience and conscience^
(Passantino et al. 2011; p. 130)
These arguments place the veterinarian in a comparable position to the paediatrician, who is
motivated solely by the best interests of his non-autonomous patient (Fettman and Rollin
2002) and this ‘paediatrician’ comparison has indeed been made directly by the BVA in
support of its animal welfare strategy:
A comparison with paediatricians is relevant: we do not expect a doctor to approach
questions of a young child’s health and welfare with a parent’s wishes, or the doctor’s
career development, as the focus of decision-making. We expect a paediatrician to
prioritise the best interests of their young patients, enabled by the child’s parents/
guardians and the doctor’s skills and resource. Promoting a patient’s best interests
sometimes requires ethically appropriate influencing of animal owners. (BVA 2016: p.20)
This vet-paediatrician comparison cannot hold true unless the ethical value of an owner’s
consent is limited to that of third party consent given in human medicine. According to the
ethical principles upheld, the owner could therefore not overrule the veterinarian’s obligation
to provide whatever is best for the animal. The veterinary profession would have to accept that,
as in human medicine, third party consent is not the ethical justification for veterinary
procedures, which are conducted solely on the basis that they are in the animal’s best interests.
The question which then arises is what are the implications of this situation for the profession
and is such an approach feasible, given the current status and role of practising veterinarians?
The BVA argument is potentially radical in resetting the traditional focus on the legal rights
of the owner who, by law, is still entitled to make decisions which protect the value of their
property as they view it (e.g. economic, emotional, etc). Indeed, prioritising the best interests
of the animal might actually cause negative economic value (a financial harm), and place a
significant financial burden on the animal’s owners. In its current form, veterinary informed
consent undoubtedly has legal significance which would prevent the vet from acting against
the wishes of the owner, assuming that the owner is not infringing other animal welfare
legislation (e.g. the UK Animal Welfare Act 2006). Furthermore, there will be examples where
it is not at all clear what is in the animal’s best interests. Practical examples of such a conflict
are not hard to come by, as Rollin powerfully summarises:
In a given day, a morally aware veterinarian may face one client who wants a perfectly
healthy dog killed and another who will not consider euthanasia of a terminally ill
animal in pain (Rollin 2002; p.1146)
In these examples, we can imagine the further tension felt by the veterinary surgeon where
the current emphasis placed on trying to promote an animal’s best interests would mean
potentially acting against an owner’s wishes. This means that the informed consent process is
further complicated, becoming an ethical pressure point, where factual uncertainty, the ethical
obligations of the vet and the owner’s legal rights to make choices collide. It must be accepted
that there is a practical difference between these two scenarios in that a veterinary surgeon may
conceivably refuse to enthanase a healthy animal but is less likely to euthanase a sick animal
against the owner’s wishes. However, even before the new UK emphasis on animal advocacy,
Main (2006) highlighted the significant lack of support UK veterinary surgeons have when
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grappling with either of these ethical dilemmas. In response to the RCVS code of professional
conduct Main states:
The veterinary surgeon is not directed to refuse completely an inappropriate request for
euthanasia or to euthanase an animal against the owner’s consent. Rather, the veteri-
nary surgeon is advised to refer to other colleagues in the first case or to contact the
authorities in the second case…. in most circumstances, a veterinary surgeon on his or
her own has very limited powers without an owner’s consent’.
(Main 2006; p.63)
This analysis points to informed consent as a growing ethical pressure point. Not only might
vets feel unsupported in such clinical situations, but professional respect for the current
articulation of the veterinary informed consent process might even be experienced as
disempowering to a veterinary surgeon who is now compelled to advocate for animals. The
nature, purpose and operationalisation in practice of veterinary informed consent therefore
need urgent re-evaluation.
Conclusions
There are clear similarities in the processes of gaining valid informed consent which protects
autonomous decision-making in both human and veterinary professional settings. However,
the purpose of informed consent and therefore its ethical significance is notably different in the
medical and veterinary contexts. Whilst medical consent protects a patient’s rights to make
autonomous decisions concerning their own body, veterinary informed consent aims to protect
an owner’s right to make autonomous decisions concerning their legal property. We have
identified the implications of the different meaning of informed consent for the protection of
‘patients’ in the veterinary setting.
The consent procedure in the veterinary setting is here described as an ethical pivot point,
where multiple competing interests must be weighed to determine a defensible course of
action. Consequently we have argued that recent emphasis in the UK on a veterinary surgeon’s
role as animal advocate needs to be considered in light of the complex ethical and legal
obligations that veterinary surgeons hold, and which are played out during the veterinary
consent process. As we have shown, promoting veterinarians as animal advocates has a
considerable effect on the meaning and value of an owner’s informed consent. This potential
shift in a veterinarian’s role may necessitate considerable change to veterinary practice and
veterinary legislation and furthermore appears to be inconsistent with the current legal status of
animals.
In the meantime, what is urgently needed is a thorough re-evaluation of the scope of
authority of veterinary informed consent. It appears that whilst veterinary surgeons might find
it hard to challenge an owner’s decisions, a full appreciation of the purpose of veterinary
informed consent reveals that owner consent cannot be considered an ethically justifiable
reason to concede to certain requests. There is little current work which explores the decision
making rationale of veterinary surgeons in this specific situation and this could be an important
area for future empirical research. Indeed, sociological research in the form of ethnographic
(Morris, 2012), interview (Ashall and Hobson-West 2017) and survey work (Kondrup et al.
2016) is beginning to open up discussion on the societal complexities of veterinary decision
making in a variety of ethically charged scenarios, including euthanasia, donation and non-
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payment. Further empirical work would significantly inform the argument made in this paper:
In short, that a lack of appreciation of the differences in meaning of informed consent given for
sometimes identical medical and veterinary practices may result in a misunderstanding of the
relevance of veterinary informed consent to ethical decision making, both by veterinary
professionals and animal owners.
Finally, even in (human) medical ethics, where patient consent is valued highly, there is a
very clear understanding that informed consent should not be considered the sole ethical
concern (Manson and O'neill 2007; Dawson 2004). That informed consent might even be
irrelevant as an ethical justification in certain circumstances is promoted by medical ethicists;
Beauchamp and Childress, in their most recent edition (2013), Bdo not presume that consent is
either necessary or sufficient for certain interventions to be justified…^ (2013, p. 110). Critics
of medical consent practices argue against the absolute prioritisation of respect for autonomy
above other ethical principles, such as beneficence, non-maleficence and justice (Corrigan
2003). Arguably, in the veterinary world, where the patient is not the one consenting, this
argument could be seen as even more powerful and pivotal. For the veterinary profession, this
means that the community should be placing at least equal emphasis on preventing harm and
the fair treatment of animals as that placed on allowing owners to make autonomous choices.
We therefore ask the veterinary profession to reflect on conclusions drawn by ethicists in the
medical field who argue that:
Informed consent plays a critical role in clinical medicine but that other models of
decision making deserve consideration under particular circumstances (Delcarmen and
Joffe 2005: pp 636)
In human medicine, an independent body such as a court has authority in cases where
the ethics of treatment with only third party consent is unclear. These types of mechanisms
may have an important role to play in the veterinary field. In fact there have been recent
calls for an ‘animal ombudsman’ (Sweeney 2015) and the RCVS are currently trialling the
use of an independent ethical review panel to deliberate on questions raised by veterinary
clinical research (RCVS, 2016). Such concepts might well be usefully applied to the
ethical questions which are commonly encountered by veterinary professionals. There
are currently limited ‘safe spaces’ (Millar and Hobson-West 2015) where veterinarians can
discuss and develop their ethical viewpoints. This needs to be addressed with the aim of
debating justifiable ethical stances at the professional, practice and individual level
(Mullan and Main 2001; Millar 2011).
Going forward, many organisations and individuals need to consider ways to support the
modern veterinary professional and equip them to develop their ethical reasoning skills.
Veterinarians should be supported to make robust ethical decisions which encompass a deeper
understanding of the ethical principles underlying their professional obligations.
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